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1Abstract
While the European Monetary Union (EMU) is now a reality, de-
bate among economists nonetheless continues about the design and
desirability of monetary unions. Since an the essential element of
a monetary union is the delegation of monetary power to a single
centralized entity, one of the key issues in this debate is whether a
monetary union will limit the e®ectiveness of stabilization policy. If
so, monetary union will not necessarily be welfare improving.
In this paper, we study a two-country world economy and con-
sider various designs of monetary union. We argue that the success of
monetary union depends on: (i) the commitment ability of the single
central bank, (ii) the policy °exibility of the national ¯scal author-
ities and the central monetary authority and (iii) the cross country
correlation of shocks. If, for example, the central bank moves before
the ¯scal authorities, then a monetary union will increase welfare as
long as ¯scal policy is su±ciently responsive to shocks. However, if
the ¯scal authorities have a restricted set of tools and/or the mone-
tary authority lacks the ability to commit to its policy, then monetary
union may not be desirable.
21 Overview
While the European Monetary Union (EMU) is now a reality, the debate
nonetheless continues about the desirability and design of monetary unions.
Many countries, such as Argentina, are considering the dollarization of their
economy as a possible policy. Further, some economists are advocating the
creation of a North American Monetary Union.1
The framework for these discussions essentially remains that outlined
by Mundell [1961]. The gains to monetary union are associated with the
reduction of transactions costs while the costs are associated with reduced
e®ectiveness of stabilization policy once monetary policy is delegated to a
single central bank. These issues are paramount in the so-called Delors report
(Emerson et al., [1992]) which provided the o±cial arguments in favor of
EMU.2 In his evaluation of the EMU, Feldstein [1997] perfectly exempli¯es
the dilemma about the evaluation of a monetary union when he writes:
"My own judgement is that, on balance, a European Monetary
Union would be an economic liability. The gains from reduced
transaction costs would be small and might, when looked at from
the global point of view, be negative. At the same time, EMU
would increase cyclical instability, raising the cyclical unemploy-
ment rate".
While certainly relevant, we think that this framework misses an im-
portant element: the design of monetary union. Clearly there is more to
monetary union that the adoption of a single currency. The success of any
monetary union, in particular the EMU, will depend in large part on the ap-
propriate design of monetary policy, including its interaction with national
¯scal policies. Existing (and defunct) monetary unions have experienced very
di®erent macroeconomic performances, particularly with regard to the sta-
bilization of output and in°ation. Understanding these outcomes may prove
valuable in the consideration of alternative monetary arrangements.
In the debate over monetary union, a number of interrelated questions
naturally emerge. First, when is it in the interest of a set of countries or
1On North American Monetary Union, see Buiter [1999], Grubel [1999] and the refer-
ences therein.
2These same points reappear in the analysis of the proposed North American Monetary
Union as discussed by Buiter [1999].
3regions to share a common currency and to delegate monetary policy to a
single central bank? Second, how should the monetary authority operate vis-
a-vis the independent ¯scal authorities, either national or regional? Third,
can this monetary/¯scal system adequately respond to shocks? Under what
conditions will stabilization policy be e®ective in a monetary union?
We address these questions using a variant of the multiple country, over-
lapping generations model set forth in Cooper-Kempf [1998].3 The model we
explore has two key ingredients: (i) the presence of country speci¯c shocks
which generate a basis for stabilization policy and (ii) strategic interaction
between the multiple ¯scal authorities and the single monetary authority.
Thus our approach is quite di®erent from Mundell [1961] which rested on
price in°exibility in a static economy without any explicit representation of
welfare and without any recognition of the vital importance of the interac-
tions between ¯scal and monetary policy..
Our analysis emphasises the institutional framework of monetary union,
particularly with regards to the conduct of stabilization policy. We con-
tend that the issues of stabilization policy and design of a monetary union
are closely interrelated: the stability of member economies within a mon-
etary union depends on the manner in which the stabilization instruments
are allocated. Thus the debate, as framed by Mundell, misses this crucial
dimension.
To take just the recent example of the EMU, designers of monetary unions
have been cognizant of these issues. For the EMU, the Maastricht treaty
contains several clauses specifying in detail the institutional set-up of the
EMU: the European system of Central Banks, including the European Cen-
tral Bank, is strongly independent of any government; its prime objective is
price stability; the ECB cannot bail-out any ¯scal authority. Further, the
Amsterdam Treaty contains a "Growth and Stability Pact" which, in e®ect,
strongly constrains the ability of member countries to run ¯scal de¯cits. A
detailed system of punishments has been established in the event a country
incurs a de¯cit which is "excessive" in light of current economic conditions.
Clearly the design of a monetary union like EMU matters a lot and cannot
be overlooked.
With respect to the key questions noted above, we ¯nd that if the mone-
3The point of our earlier exercise was to explore the gains to monetary union arising
from two sources: the reduction in transactions costs and the internalization of "beggar thy
neighbor" type monetary policies that could arise in a setting with multiple independent
monetary authorities.
4tary authority has the ability to move prior to the ¯scal authorities, then it
is able to select a monetary policy that will support the ¯rst-best allocation
of risk. Essentially, the strong central bank uses its commitment to thwart
any strategic interactions between the independent ¯scal authorities. Given
the monetary policy choice, the ¯scal authorities, using state contingent tax
rates, insure agents against unemployment risk in their countries. In this
case, the monetary union creates bene¯ts of reduced transactions costs with-
out jeopardizing stabilization policy: the supposed trade-o® does not exist.
For these reasons, monetary union is welfare improving.
We explore two alternative institutions in which the monetary union is
less successful. In one, we consider the possibility that some policymakers,
either the ¯scal or monetary authorities, are unable to adequately respond to
economic events. Here delegating monetary control to a single central bank
is generally costly: unless the country speci¯c aggregate shocks are perfectly
correlated, the single central bank will not have enough tools. For the second,
we assume that the central monetary authority does not have the ability to
credibly commit to its policy. A welfare loss from monetary union may arise
from this weak central bank that responds to the budget decisions of the
independent ¯scal authorities.4 As a consequence, each member country
resorts to money creation as a means of ¯nancing its ¯scal de¯cit to the
sole bene¯t of its own citizens since the in°ation tax is borne by all member
countries. In other words, there exists the possibility that a monetary union
is so poorly designed that a seignorage game arises between national ¯scal
authorities, leading to a loss of stabilization and welfare-reducing in°ation.
In this case, a monetary union can reduce welfare relative to a world economy
with multiple currencies.
2 First-Best Allocation
This section of the paper presents our model of the world economy and
solves for the ¯rst-best allocation. This forms a benchmark to which we can
compare the allocations obtained by di®erent monetary/¯scal systems.
4As in Sargent-Wallace [1981], a key issue is the determination of the coordination
between monetary and ¯scal policy: which is chosen ¯rst?
52.1 Basic Environment
We study an overlapping generations model which builds upon the analysis
of Cooper-Kempf [1998] by adding uncertainty and the interaction between
¯scal and monetary policy. All agents live for two periods and reside in one
of two countries. By assumption, labor is immobile.5 In each country, a
single, nonstorable good is produced. Agents work in youth, producing the
country speci¯c good and consume the goods produced in both countries in
their old age.
Agents di®er within countries due to their employment status: each pe-
riod a random fraction qt of them have an employment opportunity while the
remainder are unable to produce.6 This device allows us to include realshocks
to the model and motivates government intervention through the provision
of unemployment insurance.7 We assume that qt is a serially uncorrelated
shock with Eqt ´ q²(0;1):
With regards to their preferences, agents consume the good produced
at home and the one produced abroad. As in Cooper-Kempf [1998], we
introduce individual speci¯c shocks into preferences to motivate the gains
from monetary union. More formally, individuals' in the home country have






























Here the superscript i corresponds to the status of the agent, whether she is
employed (i = E) or unemployed (i = U), cih
t+1 is the level of consumption of
the home good when old, and c
if
t+1 is the level of consumption of the foreign
good when old, and ni
t is the supply of labor by agent i; necessarily equal
to zero if i = U. The function g(¢) represents the disutility of work, and
is assumed to be increasing, convex and continuously di®erentiable. Finally,
µt+1 is an individual speci¯c taste shock that in°uences the marginal rate of
substitution between home and foreign goods, where µt+1 is an i.i.d random
5Thus, relative to the discussion in Mundell [1961], our results are biased against ¯nding
gains to monetary union.
6Here and throughout the paper, we generally refer directly to home country variables
and denote those for the foreign country with * superscripts. Unless stated otherwise, we
assume that qt and q¤
t are nondegenerate random variables.
7Clearly this is just one of a multitude of possible shocks. This speci¯cation was chosen
partly for tractability and partly due to the ¯scal obligation that arises from the provision
of unemployment insurance, a natural and quite visible form of stabilization policy.
6variable with mean µ: Given the speci¯cation of the utility function, it is
natural to restrict µt+1²[0;1]: This shock is realized in period t+ 1, after the
labor supply decision.
The production function is the identity function and there is no capital.
As agents are identical at the time of their labor supply decision, they will
work the same amount, denoted as nt. Hence per capita output of the home
good in period t is simply ntqt:





































We assume that µt+1 and µ
¤
t+1 have the same distribution. Per capita output




The planner's objective is to maximize a weighted average of the welfare
of the agents in each generation and in each country. As the countries are
completely symmetric, the planner gives equal weight to them.8 Further,
we assume that the planner treats each generation equally. Since there is
no physical capital and preferences are intertemporally separable, we look
at allocations within a period where the planner decides on the employment
levels of generation t agents and the consumption levels for generation t¡ 1
agents. In doing so, the planner is assumed to know the current state of the
economy, including the realized tastes for each agent and the employment
rates in the two countries. Put di®erently, the planner chooses state contin-
gent consumption allocations for old agents and employment levels for young
agents where the aggregate state is denoted by s = (q¡1;q¤
¡1;q;q¤) and µ (µ
¤)
represents the realization of the taste shock for a home (foreign) agent.9
Formally, at the start of any period, the planner selects a contingent






8Thus the model abstracts from any political considerations that might lead to unequal
treatment of countries and/or generations.





the past value. In principle, the
planner could make consumption dependent on past employment status as well. Further,
µ represents the realized taste shock for an arbitrary home agent and µ
¤ is the realized













respectively. Further, the planner chooses (n(s);n¤(s)), the state contingent
employment levels of the current generation. Note that these functions are













































The resulting allocation has two important aspects: optimal risk sharing
across agents and an e±cient level of employment. Formally:







































From this proposition, the planner allocates the given amount of the two
consumption goods across the agents so that the ratio of marginal utilities
of consumption between any two agents is state independent. This is the
8familiar expression of optimal risk sharing. For our economy this implies that
any two agents with the same realization of tastes should consume identical
consumption bundles independent of nationality or employment status. As
we shall see in the decentralized economies studied below, this condition will
be met if, at the end of their ¯rst period of life, young agents have the same
levels of income regardless of employment status and nationality.
For the employment decision, recall that young agents do not know their
tastes. Thus for the planner, the employment levels may only depend on
(q;q¤) as indicated in the proposition.
3 A Multi-currency world economy
Given this planner's solution, we now turn to a discussion of decentralized
environments. Our starting point is a multiple currency world economy in
which both ¯scal and monetary policies are determined by national govern-
ments. A key issue is the ¯nancing of obligations to the unemployed and risk
sharing across countries since this is the essence of "stabilization policy" in
our environment.
This section presents a baseline model of a two-country world economy
in which the governments in each of the two countries independently choose
their ¯scal and monetary policies. In order to capture potential gains to
monetary union from a reduction in trading frictions, there is an incomplete
markets feature in our model. In each period, goods markets open before
exchange markets. Thus, old agents are unable to adjust their currency port-
folios in response to taste shocks. As we shall see, this leads to a misallocation
of resources.10
We ¯rst solve the individual's optimization problem. We then charac-
terize optimal government policies and the equilibrium allocations for this
institution.
3.1 Individual Optimization
The agent's decisions over employment and consumption goods are con-
strained by her income and by cash-in-advance constraints as both goods
10Clearly the assumed timing of markets is key to our results. In our framework, the
cost of going to an exchange market for old agents is thus in¯nite. As we shall see, the
implications of this in¯nite cost can be parameterized by the uncertainty over tastes.
9must be purchased in the national currency.11 We show these constraints in
detail for an agent in the home country.
Let Ii
t represent the income of a home agent of generation t with employ-
ment status i = E;U. Further, let mih
t and m
if
t represent the holdings of
home and foreign currency by a home agent of generation t with employment





















for i = E;U. According to the ¯rst constraint, income earned in youth is held
either as home currency or foreign currency, where et is the period t price
of foreign currency in terms of home currency. The other constraints relate
the holdings of the di®erent currencies to the consumption of ¯nal goods and
thus re°ect the cash-in-advance constraints.















for i = E;U: Note that in contrast to the planner's problem, consumption is
not dependent on the realization of the taste shock. It is in this sense that
multiple currencies lead to the misallocation of resources and thus a gain
from monetary union, a topic we explore in detail below.
Finally, in order to determine the labor supply decisions of agents, we
need to be speci¯c about their income levels and thus about government
policies. Governments are assumed to levy taxes on labor incomes, where ¿F
t
11Cooper-Kempf [1998] argue that the cash-in-advance constraints can be generated
endogenously by allowing individual governmentsto choose over legalrestrictions regarding
the type of currency used in their home markets. Here, for tractability, we impose these
constraints directly. Notable contributions by Lucas [1990], Fuerst [1992] and Christiano
and Eichenbaum [1992] also use a particular sequencing of exchanges to limit transactions
through the introduction of costly market participation.
10denotes the period t tax rate. Thus the income of a representative employed










Using this de¯nition of income, the ¯rst order condition with respect to
employment by a representative generation t agent is:12
1 = ntg
0(nt):
So, for Cobb-Douglas utility functions, individual labor supply decisions are
independent of the proportional labor income tax. Denote by ¹ n this input.







t is the nominal unemployment bene¯t paid to an unemployed agent.
These transfers are ¯nanced from the tax revenues collected from the em-
ployed agents and the printing of new currency as described further below.
3.2 Market Equilibrium given government policies
In each period, a goods market and a money market open in each of the two
countries. The market clearing conditions for the good markets, home and
abroad respectively, in period t + 1 are:
qt+1¹ n = qtc
Eh























t+1 + (1 ¡ qt)c
Uf
t+1 (4b)
The left side of these expressions is the output by employed agents in period
t+1, using the fact that all employed agents produce ¹ n units of output. The
right side corresponds to spending on home (foreign) goods by the four types
of agents: employed and unemployed in each of the two countries.
For the money markets, the given stock of ¯at money must equal the
nominal value of output. For the home and foreign countries this implies:
12The derivation of this expression is part of the proof of Proposition 2.







t ¹ n: (5b)











t + (1 ¡ qt)m
Uf
t ): (6)
Finally, the governments each face a budget constraint. The transfers to
the unemployed must be ¯nanced by either the collection of tax revenues or
the printing of money, denoted ¢F
t : Thus, for the home country,
ptqt¿
F
t ¹ n + ¢
F
t = (1 ¡ qt)b
F
t (7a)







t ¹ n + ¢
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These transfers to agents occur prior to exchange market trades. Thus,
the transfer of domestic currency to unemployed agents does not imply that
they are unable to consume foreign goods.
The allocation given government policies is then characterized by:
Proposition 2 In a world economy with multiple currencies, given govern-
ment transfer policies the (home) consumption allocations are given by:
c
Eh




















































In these expressions, the rate of growth of the money supply is denoted
by ¾F
t and is computed directly from the transfers. That is, ¾F
t Mt = ¢F
t ´





t¡1. As usual, there are analogous
expressions for foreign agents.
123.3 Equilibrium Government Policies
The ¯scal and monetary authorities within each country are integrated. How-
ever, governments act non-cooperatively vis-a-vis one another. Their objec-
tive is to maximize the expected lifetime utility of a representative young
agent in their own country. They choose tax rates and money creation rates
simultaneously each period, after observing the fraction of people currently
employed and taking as given the policy choices of the other government.13
We ¯nd that the equilibrium solution of the non-cooperative game is
characterized by:
Proposition 3 In a world economy with °exible exchange rates and multiple

















In this expression, »t represents the period t policy choice of the home
government. This policy re°ects the rate of labor taxation and the rate of
money creation. In equilibrium the governments are indi®erent with respect
to the nature of the taxation: the optimal policy is characterized by combi-
nations of the labor tax and the in°ation tax that transfer a given amount
to the unemployed. This indeterminacy, reminiscent of the Tinbergen rule,
simply re°ects the existence of two instruments at the disposal of govern-
ments when each government only has a goal: to insure agents against the
risk of unemployment.14
















13Note that the money supplies in each country are the only state variables in the
system as there is no physical capital. In addition, policy choices can be contingent on
the realized values of the employment shocks in the two countries. The equilibria that we
characterize are dependent only on the country speci¯c employment rates and are Markov
perfect given this representation of the state space. Note that these restrictions seem
natural given that the inherited stocks of ¯at money in each country are, in the equilibria
we consider, irrelevant for real allocations. Of course, there may exist other equilibria in
which inherited money stocks matter.
14The fact that there are more instruments than targets in the multi-currency environ-
ment is important for understanding conditions under which monetary union will lead to













Note that the optimal non-cooperative government policies perfectly insure
agents from the current risk of unemployment. Further, the °exible exchange
rate system implies that consumptions are equalized across countries as well.
In this sense, the multiple currency equilibrium with optimal government
policies provides insurance both within and across countries.
However, there are some important di®erences between this allocation
and that obtained by the planner. First, the labor supply of the home (for-
eign) agents is independent of q (q¤) as the Cobb-Douglas preferences imply
that this decision is independent of the tax rate. In the planner's solution,
employment varies with q (q¤) in order to stabilize total output. Interestingly,
this optimal employment policy would arise if the government had access to
lump-sum taxes.
Second, these agents su®er from not being able to adequately tie their
demand for currencies to the actual value of the preference parameter µ:
That is, in the planner's solution, consumption is optimally dependent on
the realized taste shocks. In the world economy with multiple currencies,
this dependence is not feasible.
Using the expressions for consumption allocations, the expected utility








































+ ln(¹ n) ¡ qg(¹ n):
In the remainder of the paper, we use this measure as the benchmark relative
to which the various designs of a monetary union will be compared and
assessed.
4 Strong Central Bank
We now consider a monetary union de¯ned by the presence of a single cur-
rency and a single monetary authority which represents the interests of
14agents in member countries.15 In this section, we make a key assumption
regarding timing: the central bank chooses its policy before the ¯scal au-
thorities in each period. We term this a strong central bank since the timing
assumption implies that the monetary authority has commitment power vis-
a-vis ¯scal authorities. The next section of the paper explores the alternative
case in which the central bank moves after the ¯scal authorities.16
This section ¯rst shows the optimization problem of a representative agent
in a given country and then explores the conditions for equilibrium given
government policies. Then, as in the case of multiple currencies, we explore
the equilibria of the game between governments under the assumption of a
strong monetary union, de¯ned as a monetary union with a strong central
bank.
As will become clear, this is an institutional structure that creates gains
to monetary union through the presence of a common currency. These gains
arise directly from the reduction of trading frictions. Further, the reduction
in the number of stabilization tools in each country (due to the creation of
a central monetary authority) does not limit the extent to which agents are
insured against aggregate shocks. Essentially, the ¯scal authorities can re-
spond to country speci¯c unemployment shocks and thus e±ciently insure
the incomes of agents against employment risk. The risk associated with
unemployment variations is dissipated in the goods markets.17 So in con-
trast to the predictions arising from the work of Mundell, there is no tradeo®
between stabilization policy losses and reductions in transactions costs as-
sociated with the creation of a monetary union. This section of the paper
concludes with some discussion of the robustness of these ¯ndings.
4.1 Individual Optimization
Given the presence of a common currency, individual's with employment
opportunities optimally choose their labor supply. All agents use income
15To maintain symmetry, we assume that this stock of money is initially distributed
equally across the two countries.
16Interestingly, this parallels the discussion of Sargent and Wallace [1981] who analyze
closed economy monetary models with two polar forms of coordination between the ¯scal
and monetary authorities.
17This is clearly a strong result that, as we shall see, depends on the unitary elasticity
of demand. Still, the economics of the problem implies that supply shocks are partially
o®set by price variations which tend to stabilize labor incomes.
15received in youth to ¯nance their consumption expenditures when old. In
contrast to the world economy with multiple currencies, agents do not have
to make portfolio decisions prior to the realization of their taste shocks. It
is precisely the relaxation of the cash-in-advance constraint that leads to the
gains associated with monetary union.
Formally, the representative young, employed agent of generation t from


























t+1 = ptnt(1 ¡ ¿
S
t ) ´ I
E
t :
Here the tax rate on the income of the home agent is given by ¿S
t : In the
budget constraint, pt (p¤
t) represents the period t price of home (foreign)
goods in terms of the common currency.
The ¯rst order conditions for the representative, employed home agent
are given by:
g
















Clearly (5) implies a constant labor supply equal to that obtained in the
previous case, n: Thus, with these preferences, the monetary institution has
no e®ect on employment decisions. Since the consumption decision is made
after the realization of the taste shock, consumption levels respond to this
shock.
The representative unemployed, young agent from the home country de-
cides how to allocate income, denoted by IU
t , across the consumption goods in
















16Since these agents are unemployed, their nominal income is equal to the
unemployment bene¯ts they receive both from their national ¯scal author-
ity, denoted by bS
t : There are analogous sets of conditions for employed and
unemployed foreign agents.
The ¯scal policies are given by the levels of labor taxation and unem-
ployment bene¯ts, (¿S
t ;bS
t ) for the home government and (¿¤S
t ;b¤S
t ) for the
foreign government. The central monetary authority creates money in period
t which is distributed to the ¯scal authorities of the two governments. We
let ¢S
t and ¢¤S
t denote the period t money transfers to the home and foreign
governments.





t ¹ nptqt + ¢
S
t : (14)
The left side of this expression is the level of unemployment bene¯ts paid
by the home government. The right side is the sum of their nominal tax
revenues and the money created that °ows to the home government.
4.2 Equilibrium
For this institutional structure, the monetary authority determines the rate
of money creation prior to the decisions of the two ¯scal authorities. In game
theoretical terms, we explore a two-stage game, where the central bank plays
¯rst, and then the two national governments play second, non-cooperatively
determining their own policy. From (14), the money transfers simply sup-
plement the resources available for the funding of unemployment insurance.
Thus, the ¯scal authorities, given these transfers, will design UI systems that
equate the incomes of employed and unemployed agents, as in the regime of
multiple currencies.
Taking these decision rules by the ¯scal authorities as given, the monetary
authority can use money creation to ¯nance these UI programs and thus
redistribute nominal incomes across countries to o®set adverse employment
shocks. However, in equilibrium, the response of prices to variations in the
employment shocks is su±cient for thestabilization of nominal income: active
intervention by the central monetary authority is not required. Thus we ¯nd:
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium in the strong monetary union
where the rate of money creation is zero, irrespective of the values of the
17shocks, the taxation rates are equal to
¿
S
t = 1 ¡ qt
¿
¤S
t = 1 ¡ q
¤
t:



























Note that the consumption levels for each type of agent depend on the
ex post realization of the individual speci¯c taste shock µ. This dependence
of consumption on µ; as in the planner's allocation, is surely one of the gains
associated with having a common currency.
A very important aspect of the resulting allocation is that agents' nominal
income levels are independent of both their individual employment status and
against country speci¯c shocks to employment rates (qt,q¤
t) in their youth.
The ¯rst form of insurance is provided directly by the taxation policy of
the ¯scal authorities, as in the above proposition. Recall from Proposition
2 that in the economy with independent ¯scal and monetary policies, the
authorities were indi®erent between ¯nancing UI bene¯ts with labor income
taxes or seignorage. Essentially, the strong monetary union removes one of
the two tools so that the ¯scal authorities are led to the use of labor income
taxes to ¯nance the country speci¯c UI systems.18
The second form of insurance is provided by the stabilization of nominal
incomes in response to the supply side employment shocks. Given the uni-
tary elasticity of demand, created by the Cobb-Douglas preference structure,
18Thus one might conjecture that an important element in this discussion of stabilization
with strong monetary union has to do with the number of instruments relative to targets.
In our economy, a single government has two instruments to hit a target. Hence, as
demonstrated in Proposition 2, there is an indeterminacy with respect to the nature of
intervention. So, monetary union is not destabilizing here because even in the absence of
active monetary intervention, the ¯scal powers are su±cient. We return to this issue of
instruments vs. targets in Section 5.
18variations in prices e®ectively o®set the exogenous variations in employment
rates leaving the nominal income earned by young employed agents indepen-
dent of qt. If, as we assume, the money supply is equally distributed across
the two countries in the initial period, then the young agents in each country
will have equal shares of the money supply in all time periods. This guaran-
tees that their nominal incomes are stabilized in the equilibrium with zero
money growth.
There are other equilibria under strong monetary union. From Propo-
sition 2, it is apparent that consumption allocations depend jointly on the
rate of income taxation and the rate of money creation. The allocation
in Proposition 4 picks one such combination of policies. In particular, if
the lower support of the country speci¯c employment shocks is su±ciently
large, there will exist equilibria with positive money creation along with pos-
itive state contingent income taxes. To guarantee that nominal incomes are
equal across countries, the nominal transfers to each country will be identi-
cal. Importantly, all of these equilibria support the same real allocations of
consumption and employment.
In this equilibrium the welfare of the representative agent is:











+ ln(n) ¡ qg(n): (16)
Here the expectation is taken with respect to the individual speci¯c taste
shock µt+1 and to the employment shocks during theagent's lifetime (qt;qt+1;q¤
t+1).
4.3 Welfare Comparisons
This expression of welfare allows us to compare the allocation under a strong
central bank with that obtained by a world economy with multiple currencies.
We ¯nd that:
Proposition 5 The di®erence in expected utilities achieved under a strong
central bank and a °exible exchange rate world economy with multiple cur-
rencies is always positive and equal to:





















Clearly the gain to monetary union comes from the ability of agents' to
response to the realization of their taste shocks. Analytically, this gain is
re°ected in the var(µ) term in ¤SF: increases in the variability of the taste
shocks will reduce VF and thus increase ¤SF.
Relative to the planner's solution, the allocation under a strong central
bank succeeds in producing optimal risk sharing: the nominal incomes and
thus consumption allocations are equalized given tastes. In e®ect, the goods
markets equalize nominal income across countries and the ¯scal authorities
equalize incomes across employment status. Thus optimal risk sharing is
supported. However, as in the case of multiple currencies, the labor supply
decision is not ¯rst best. Again this re°ects the presence of proportional
income taxes or, equivalently, the absence of lump sum taxation.
4.4 Alternative preferences
Under a strong monetary union, inactivity is optimal for the central mone-
tary authority. However, this is a consequence of the fact that Cobb-Douglas
preferences have the special property of constant budget shares. In our multi-
good setting, this implies that nominal spending on the good produced in a
given country is constant. Thus, as the quantity of output varies, the price
o®sets these movements and nominal income is constant. It is precisely be-
cause of this unitary elasticity of demand that nominal incomes are stabilized
across countries without the need for transfers from the central bank.19




t+1 + (1 ¡ µ)c
Ef
t+1) ¡ g(nt):
With this preference structure, labor supply is still given by the condition of
ntg
0(nt) = 1
but, in contrast to the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation, aggregate budget shares
will depend on realizations of (qt;q¤
t). In particular, if agents have identical,
19Note that stabilization of nominal income implies that agents with the same tastes
have the same consumption bundle (a condition for e±cient allocations) since agents face
the same prices.
20nonstochastic, symmetric preferences with µ = :5; then, in equilibrium, pt =
p¤
t:20 This implies that nominal GDP in the home country relative to the




since all agents produce the constant level of output n. So, if shocks are
perfectly correlated across countries, then risk sharing remains optimal even
with an inactive central bank.
If employment shocks are not perfectly positively correlated, nominal
GDP in the home country will not equal nominal GDP in the foreign country.
Hence, risk sharing across countries will be imperfect in the absence of central
bank intervention. In fact, the central bank should create money and transfer
it to the ¯scal authority of the government in the country with the low level
of nominal GDP. Given these funds, the ¯scal authorities will equalize the
nominal incomes of employed and unemployed agents. In e®ect, the optimal
central bank rule is to stabilize nominal GDP and not necessarily prices.
In equilibrium, this equalization of nominal incomes will lead to e±cient
allocations of risk both within and across countries. So, the ¯rst best alloca-
tion of risk can be supported but, as this example illustrates, this outcome
will generally require an active central bank. One might interpret this as a
form of ¯scal federalism given the ability of the central bank to redistribute
real wealth across countries. Of course, the central bank is doing so through
money creation rather than direct taxation.
5 Weak Monetary Union
The results obtained thus far indicate that concerns over the loss of stabiliza-
tion policy through the creation of a monetary union may not be justi¯ed.
However, it is important to realize that these results re°ect two strong as-
sumptions about the conduct of monetary policy:
² the central bank was able to choose monetary policy before the national
authorities selected ¯scal variables,
20Clearly in this example there are no gains to monetary union since var(µ) = 0: The
point we make about the need for central bank intervention would easily extend to an
example with taste shocks as long as the equilibrium required pt = p¤
t.
21² both the central bank and the ¯scal authorities had a rich set of state
contingent policy instruments at their disposal.
This section of the paper focuses on stabilization policy under alterna-
tive institutional structures which relax these strong assumptions. For these
cases, we ¯nd that indeed monetary union may entail a loss in stabilization
creating a tradeo® between the liquidity gains of joining a monetary union
and the welfare losses from relatively ine®ective stabilization policy.
In the ¯rst case, we retain the assumption that the central bank has
commitment power vis-a-vis the ¯scal authorities but impose restrictions on
the nature of the ¯scal interventions. We term this case a "¯scally constrained
monetary union". In particular, we assume that the ¯scal authorities are
unable to set state contingent tax rates thus, in e®ect, reducing the set of
instruments available to the policymakers.
In our second case, we weaken the central bank along two dimensions.
First, we restrict the nature of the contingencies associated with monetary
transfers so that the distribution of seignorage is the same across countries
and independent of employment shocks. Second, we relax the assumption
that the central bank has commitment power relative to the ¯scal authorities.
We term this a "weak central bank" case. We motivate and analyze this
alternative extensive form structure where the ¯scal authorities move prior
to the monetary authority.21
5.1 A Fiscally Constrained Monetary Union
Up to now, our analysis indicates that the welfare loss from monetary union
associated with a reduction in the number of policy instruments may not oc-
cur, given that the ¯scal authorities retain stabilization tools (income taxes)
and that the monetary authority has the ability to create money in order to
stabilize nominal GDP. But what if some of these instruments are missing?22
21Chari-Kehoe [1997] make a similar point in a two-period, non-stochastic, reduced form
model with government debt and money. Their in¯nite horizon model provides a more
formal argument but is essentially a two-period structure.
22Or, equivalently what if there are more "shocks" than instruments? In fact, consid-
eration of this question leads one to wonder about the determination of the number of
policy instruments. In the absence of a theory of policy instruments, we take the set of
tools available to policymakers as exogeneous but recognize that this is a rather strong
assumption. For example, a country that had previously relied upon seignorage might
develop an income tax system upon joining a monetary union.
22Suppose, for example, that the ¯scal authorities are unable to set tax
rates contingent on the realized value of the employment shock: i.e., assume
¿ = ¿¤ = ¹ ¿. In the multiple currency institution, this is not a problem since
the condition for e±cient risk sharing can be satis¯ed by the appropriate
choice of a money creation rate by the country speci¯c monetary authority.
However, with the creation of a monetary union, the ¯scal authorities
will lose this stabilization tool. Does a welfare loss result? Is this ¯scally
constrained monetary union still desirable relative to a world economy
with multiple currencies? We ¯nd that the answers depend critically on the
policies available to the monetary authority and, as suggested by Mundell,
on the correlation of shocks across countries.
Recall that we have assumed the central monetary authority can make
country speci¯c transfers. In this case, it is feasible for the common central
bank to make monetary transfers to the individual governments necessary
to ¯nance their unemployment insurance schemes. In fact, given the ¯xed
tax rates the monetary authority can print and transfer money to the ¯scal
authorities to guaranteethat the incomes of employed and unemployed agents
are equated, within a country. However, in the resulting allocation, income
levels and thus consumptions of agents across countries will not be equated
unless the employment shocks are perfectly positively correlated.
Thus, in contrast to the allocations characterized in Proposition 5, risk
sharing is imperfect unless corr(qt;q¤
t) = 1. In fact, if shocks are perfectly
correlated, the allocation in the ¯scally constrained monetary union will be
identical to that achieved under strong monetary union. In the language of
instruments and targets, the perfect correlation of the shocks implies that
one less instrument is needed so that the monetary authority can generate
full insurance with its two instruments.
If corr(qt;q¤
t) 6= 1, then there is clearly a loss in stabilization from the
creation of a monetary union. In this case, a tradeo® emerges: there are
liquidity gains from a monetary union that are increasing in the variability
of the taste shocks and stabilization losses that depend on corr(qt;q¤
t). With
the restrictions outlined above imposed on the ¯scal authorities (¿ = ¿¤ = ¹ ¿),
we ¯nd:
Proposition 6 In a ¯scally constrained monetary union, (i) if corr(qt;q¤
t) =
1, the allocation is identical to that obtained under strong monetary union,
(ii) if shocks are su±ciently correlated across countries and tastes are su±-
ciently variable, then the monetary union allocation will dominate the out-
23come with multiple currencies and (iii) if employment shocks are not perfectly
positively correlated and taste shocks are not su±ciently variable, then mon-
etary union will not be welfare improving.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Of course, as suggested by Mundell, these considerations lead to pre-
dictions about which types of economies will naturally merge to create a
monetary union. From these results it is clearly those economies with posi-
tively correlated shocks and who trade with one another (so that there are
indeed gains from trades and the reduction of transactions costs) which will
pro¯t from monetary union.
5.2 Constrained Central Bank
Instead of restricting the nature of interventions by the ¯scal authorities,
suppose that the central bank had limited powers of intervention. In partic-
ular, consider a central bank which was forced to equalize monetary transfers
to the national governments. While our model contains no rationale for this
restriction, to the extent that central banks (such as the ECB) are contrained
in this manner, we can evaluate monetary union under these conditions.
As a starting point, consider again Proposition 4. In that setting, the
¯rst-best allocation of risk was attained without intervention by the central
bank. Thus for our baseline model, there is no impact of constraining the
central bank.
Now suppose that we consider the implications of a constrained central
bank along with the constraints on the ¯scal authorities imposed above:
¿ = ¿¤ = ¹ ¿: In this case, a version of Proposition 6 holds. If the correlation
of shocks is equal to 1, then the central bank will not have any incentive
to di®erentiate transfers to the countries. By continuity, if this correlation
is near 1, then the welfare losses from the additional contraints on the cen-
tral bank will be minimal and thus monetary union continues to dominate
the allocation with multiple currencies. At the other extreme, if the taste
shocks are not too variable and employment shocks are not perfectly pos-
itively correlated, then monetary union will still not be welfare improving.
Clearly, adding more restrictions to monetary union once ¯scal constraints
are in place will not be welfare improving.
The welfare costs of a constrained central bank will be larger if preferences
are not Cobb-Douglas. As we have seen for the speci¯cation in which goods
24are perfect substitutes, an active monetary policy with unequal transfers to
countries is desirable even if the ¯scal authorities are unconstrained.
5.3 Weak Central Bank
We de¯ne a weak central bank by two institutional features: (i) the two
national ¯scal authorities move ¯rst but act non-cooperatively and (ii) the
central monetary authority moves second and fully ¯nances the total sum of
national de¯cits of the two governments. In other words, such a weak central
bank functions under a full bail-out clause in which it is committed to meeting
the ¯nancial needs of the ¯scal authorities of member governments.
There are a number of reasons for being interested in such an institution.
First, by looking at this extreme, one can better understanding the bene¯ts
of imposing a no bail-out clause, as appears to be the case in the European
Monetary Union. Second, to the extent that a central bank cannot commit
to a no-bail out clause, understanding the outcomes in this extreme case are
of interest.23 Third, there are examples of countries in which independent
authorities interacted through a common central bank leading, in some cases,
to excessive in°ation.24. Finally, though our model has no interest bearing
government debt, the weak monetary union case captures the implications
of a monetary authority which monetizes the debt of ¯scal authorities.25
Given that the three government actors (the two ¯scal authorities and
the monetary authority) face two constraints, the policy choices must be
interrelated. Here, we suppose that the monetary authority must respond to
the choices of the independent ¯scal authorities. Its strategy is then easily
23In fact, Beetsma and Uhlig [1997] motivate their study of the "Stability Pact" by
noting ".. there is fear that a high de¯cit member country or a member country in
recession may successfully pressure the ECB into loosening its monetary policy."
24There are other studies of the interaction between independent parts of a government
that share a common budget constraint. See, for example, Aizenman [1992], Aizenman
and Powell [1998], Zarazaga[undated] and Chari and Kehoe [1997] for discussions of this
point in the context of macroeconomics.
25As noted earlier, this coordination of policy issue arises in Sargent-Wallace [1981]. In
the appendix of that paper, they outline a overlapping generations model with government
debt, private storage and money as alternative assets. Through restricted participation in
asset markets, they characterize an equilibrium in which the real rate of return exceeds
the growth of the economy. The consequence of this for the case in which the monetary
authority moves after the ¯scal authority, in their words, is "Sooner or later in a monetarist
economy the result is additional in°ation."
25de¯ned: it is obligated to monetize de¯cits.
5.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
To the extent that the interaction between the government entities is the
only di®erence between this structure and the strong central bank case, we
can use the conditions from that case to describe the consumption and labor
supply decision rules of agents given monetary and ¯scal policies. Using these
conditions, we can focus on the interaction between the ¯scal authorities of
the two governments.
As before, each government provides unemployment insurance to agents
currently unemployed. These °ows are ¯nanced by tax revenues from em-
ployed agents and from the printing of money. Since the central bank is
required to ¯nance the de¯cits of the two governments, the evolution of the

























t ) denote the monetary de¯cit in the home (foreign) country,
bW
t the transfer to the unemployed and ¿W
t (¿¤W
t ) the tax rate set in a "weak"
environment. Put di®erently, the change in the money supply equals the sum
of the nominal de¯cits across the two countries.
An important element of this institution is made apparent by these ex-
pressions. The weak monetary union introduces an interaction across the
¯scal authorities that did not exist in either the multiple currency or strong
monetary union cases. Speci¯cally, under a weak monetary union, de¯cit
spending by one country is ¯nanced by an in°ation tax that is partially paid
by the agents of the other country. Thus the "beggar thy neighbor" type
seignorage policies that promoted gains to monetary union in Cooper-Kempf
[1998] reappear here under a weak central bank. Interestingly, these e®ects
were absent in the other institutional settings. This is a consequence of our
timing assumptions: agents were able to go to exchange markets after receiv-
ing government transfers. In contrast, Cooper-Kempf [1998] assume that the
transfers are received after the exchange markets are closed thus providing a
tax base for seignorage.
Taking the response of the weak monetary authority as given, each ¯scal
authority in period t chooses the level of taxes and UI bene¯ts to maximize
26the expected utility of generation t agents. In doing so, each government
takes the ¯scal policy of the other government as given. Further, each gov-
ernment fully perceives the e®ects of its policies on equilibrium prices.
In general, characterizing additional features of this equilibrium is di±cult
since the presence of country speci¯c shocks implies that the distribution of
the nominal money supply across the two countries is stochastic. Hence in
the remainder of this section we make an additional assumption that the
economies are symmetric: µ = 1
2:
To characterize the equilibrium, let Dt represent the level of nominal
spending in period t+1 on the home good by generation t (home and foreign)
agents. Dt is also the nominal income of generation t+1 employment agents.
That is, from market clearing:
pt+1qt+1n = Dt = µ(qtI
E
t + (1 ¡ qt)I
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With this added structure we ¯nd:
Proposition 7 With µ =
1
2; there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all












t for all t:
Proof. See appendix.
According to this proposition, when the central bank is weak, there is
no direct taxation by either country to ¯nance transfers to its unemployed
people. To the contrary, all transfers are fully monetized.26 This indeed can
be very simply understood. Suppose an adverse shock hits thehome economy.
The home ¯scal authority has two alternative ways to raise compensation
to the unemployed: it can either tax its currently employed agents or ask
the weak central bank to ¯nance its transfers. Using this in°ation tax is a
dominant strategy for each of the governments since part of the tax burden
is borne by agents outside their country. Nevertheless there is a limit to
26In some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Russia, there is vivid evidence of the
in°ation predicted by this proposition. We discuss this in our conclusions.
27the amount raised through monetization since the higher prices lead to a
reduction in the utility of young employed agents.
The equilibrium is symmetric: each country runs a de¯cit in each period
which is proportional to the level of nominal spending in that country. These
rates of money creation are dependent on the level of unemployment in each
of the countries. Since the de¯cit spending is used to ¯nance a transfer to
unemployed agents which is partially paid for by the employed agents, it is
natural that the rate of money creation should be an increasing function of
the unemployment rate in the home country.









Clearly, money growth is zero if both economies exhibit full employment and
is increasing in the rates of unemployment of member countries.
5.3.2 Welfare Comparisons
From these propositions, we see that a characteristic of a weak monetary
union is that incomes of unemployed and employed agents are not equalized
within a country. Hence, as they face the same prices, their consumption al-
locations will not be the same, for a given realization of the taste shock µ: So,
the allocation under a weak monetary union will not satisfy the conditions for
optimal risk sharing: this institution does not facilitate stabilization through
the available policy instruments. Instead, these policies are used strategically
in order to induce the central monetary authority to create money. This leads
us to study the welfare properties of a weak monetary union, both in rela-
tion to a strong monetary union and the allocation obtained with multiple
currencies.
Weak vs. Strong Central Bank The gain to a strong monetary union
relative to a world economy of multiple currencies was driven by the liquidity
services associated with a single currency. In the institution of a monetary
authority with commitment, there were no insurance losses associated with
monetary union: the ¯scal authorities provide insurance within a country and
the monetary authorities, by maintaining a constant money supply, enabled
the price system to insure nominal incomes. In the weak monetary union
28institution, the liquidity gains may be o®set by the welfare loss associated
with the seignorage game between countries. In fact,
Proposition 8 The allocation under strong monetary union provides all
agents with higher expected utility than the allocation under a weak mone-
tary union.
Proof. See appendix.
Clearly the allocation obtained under strong monetary union is feasible
with a weak central bank. However, at that con¯guration of policies, both
¯scal authorities would have an incentive to reduce income taxes and rely
on money transfers to ¯nance unemployment insurance. This is the point
behind Proposition 7. In equilibrium, both governments pursue strategies
which lead to in°ation and, in equilibrium, lower welfare than the strong
monetary union as indicated by this proposition. Thus, there is a prisonner's
dilemma structure to this game between the ¯scal authorities.
Weak Central Bank vs. Multiple Currencies The comparison be-
tween a monetary union and an economy with multiple currencies is relevant
to determining whether there are gains to creating such a union. Relative to
the world economy, monetary union might, in fact, be welfare reducing if the
in°ation costs are large relative to the liquidity gains.
Given the de¯nitions of incomes for both categories of agents within a
country, it is easy to compute the welfare achieved in a weak monetary union.
From this, the di®erence of welfares achieved under weak monetary union and
a °exible exchange-rate system is equal to:
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which, using a Taylor series expansion can be written as















29The ¯rst of these terms represents the gains to monetary union associated
with the liquidity bene¯ts of a single currency. The gain to monetary union
is zero if there are no taste shocks and is increasing as the variability of the
taste shock increases. The second term has two components relating to the
realizations of the supply shocks and both are negative. This term captures
the loss in welfare from the interaction across countries through seignorage.
Proposition 9 If the variability of the taste shock is su±ciently small and
both ¹ q and ¹ q¤are signi¯cantly below 1, then economic welfare will be lower
under a weak monetary union than in the world economy with multiple cur-
rencies. If ¹ q and ¹ q¤are near 1, var(µ) is small and the variability of taste
shocks is large enough, then a weak monetary union dominates a world econ-
omy with multiple currencies.
Comparing this result for a weak monetary union with that for the con-
strained ¯scal structure, Proposition 6, is instructive. For both cases, we see
that in order for monetary union to be welfare improving, taste shocks must
be su±ciently variable. Otherwise, in the presence of a weak central bank,
a country is adversely a®ected by the in°ationary policies of other countries.
From Proposition 7, we found that the extent to which countries will in°ate
via the common central bank depends on their individual countries rates of
unemployment. Hence, if unemployment rates are su±ciently low on aver-
age and not too volatile, then a monetary union with a weak central bank
may indeed be welfare improving as long as taste are su±ciently variable.
Interestingly, contrasting Propositions 6 and 9, for the former the costs of
monetary union are related to the correlation of shocks while for the latter
they depend on the average employment rates.
The main lesson from this section is that a weak monetary authority can
create an environment in which ¯scal authorities ¯nd a cheap source of rev-
enues from the money demands of foreign agents. In equilibrium the resulting
welfare loss from excessive in°ation may indeed dominate the transactions
gains from a single currency. This is more likely if tastes are not too vari-
able (var(µ) ¼ 0) and unemployment rates high so that the rate of money
creation by both countries is high.
306 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to examine the e®ectiveness of stabilization
policy within a monetary union. To do so, we explored the allocations of
a stochastic two-country overlapping generations model under alternative
monetary/¯scal institutions.
In the extreme case of a strong central monetary authority with commit-
ment power and ¯scal authorities with the ability to set state contingent tax
rates, a monetary union unambiguously increases welfare. In this institu-
tional design, the delegation of monetary policy to a single central bank does
not jeopardize the conduct of stabilization policy. The tradeo® envisioned
by Mundell and others does not exist. Further, the gain to monetary union
does not rest on labor mobility since in our model, by construction, labor is
immobile.
However, there are designs of a monetary union which do not increase
welfare precisely because stabilization policy is impaired. In particular, if the
set of policy instruments open to ¯scal authorities is su±ciently restricted,
then monetary union may not increase welfare. Despite having commitment
power, the central bank lacks the tools to stabilize in the presence of country
speci¯c shocks that are not perfectly correlated.
Further, if the monetary authority is weak and thus in°uenced by the
de¯cit spending of member countries, then the gains to monetary union may
be more than o®set by the adverse consequences of in°ation. A weak central
bank opens the door to strategic interaction by the ¯scal authorities and thus
to excessive in°ation.
These results are normative in that they point to potential gains from
monetary union. Will these gains be realized? Cooper-Kempf [1998] argue
that though there are gains to a monetary union, the incentives for each
country imply that these welfare gains will not be realized without collec-
tive action. In particular, Cooper-Kempf [1998] ¯nd that a game in which
countries, in e®ect, decide to join a monetary union or not has a prison-
ers' dilemma structure: the cooperative outcome of monetary union is not
a Nash equilibrium of this game. Those results can be extended to the en-
vironment studied here. Though Propositions 4, 6 and 10 imply that the
allocation under a strong monetary union Pareto dominates that obtained
under multiple currencies, the establishment of a monetary union is not a
Nash equilibrium. Given a conjectured equilibrium of a monetary union, a
country would deviate and impose a requirement that its currency be used in
31domestic transactions thus e®ectively ending the proposed monetary union.
From this perspective, the reaping of the gains from monetary union requires
collective action.
Some general lessons can be drawn from this analysis. On the issue of
commitment vis-a-vis the ¯scal authorities, two elements seem important.
First, ¯scal pacts seem important insofar as they reduce pressures on the
monetary authority. While not formally part of our model, clearly restrictions
on de¯cits would limit the "beggar thy neighbor" type in°ation that could
undermine monetary union. Second, the monetary authority must adopt
rules that insulate its decisions from the ¯scal pressures exerted by member
governments.27 In this regard, rules that specify growth rates for monetary
aggregates seem more desirable relative to rules that respond to ¯scal policy
through, for example, the stabilization of interest rates.28
On the issue of determining which groups of countries might bene¯t from
a monetary union, two factors should be kept in mind. First, one of the gains
we have identi¯ed pertains to the reduction in consumption misallocations
from the adoption of a single currency. Clearly these gains are larger the
more the countries trade with one another. Second, unless the central bank is
su±ciently strong and ¯scal authorities are su±ciently active in the conduct
of stabilization policy, the delegation of monetary policy will entail some
stabilization losses. If so, our results point to the fact that countries with a
high correlation of shocks will su®er less from the centralization of monetary
policy.
Even though these ¯ndings are rather abstract, we do think that they
provide useful insights on actual or possible monetary unions. Let us take the
example of a mature and clearly successful monetary union like the US. For
the U.S., Rolnick, Smith and Weber [1993] develop an argument linking the
clause in the U.S. Constitution which created a central monetary authority
with a desire to avoid seignorage games between colonies. On the ¯scal side,
Poterba [1996] discusses the nature of balanced-budget rules across states.
The centralization of monetary authority along with these ¯scal constraints
seems su±cient to eliminate the seignorage games though there is always the
possibility of a link between state budget de¯cits, transfers from a Federal
government and the monetization of any resulting debt.
27For the case of Argentina, Saiegh and Tommasi [1999] discuss the Convertibility Law
of 1991 as a means of limiting in°ationary pressures.
28Clearly this discussion suggests an interesting extension of our analysis would be to
evaluate a variety of monetary rules in a version of the model with government debt.
32This concern visibly has been absent or neglected by the rulers of South
American countries in the20th century, up to recently. Aizenman [1998] dis-
cusses the experiences of Brazil and Argentina from this perspective. Saiegh
and Tommasi [1999] discuss the recent experience of Argentina in terms of a
weak central bank responding to the actions of independent ¯scal entities.29
Again, our theoretical model makes clear a major root of these hyperin°a-
tionary episodes: the laxity of monetary authorities and the uncooperative
behavior of fragmented ¯scal authorities leading to seignorage games.
A similar fate happened in the former Soviet Union, when it was replaced
by the Community of Independent States. In the infancy of the C.I.S., in
the early 1990s, local authorities had the ability to ¯nance local expenditures
through the creation of rubles by the Russian Central Bank. Essentially, the
various republics could, for example, subsidize their enterprises by seignor-
age revenues. The outcome has been an outburst of money creation by the
Russian Central Bank and a total neglect of the building of a proper ¯scal
system, able to generate funds for public objectives by means of taxation,
leading to violent hyperin°ation. In°ation has been put under control when
the Russian Central Bank stopped bailing out public governments. Again,
this is perfectly consistent with our ¯ndings.30
Turning to the case of the EMU, it is of course far too early to assess its
soundness by means of its actual performance. Still, our theoretical reasoning
allows us to o®er some appreciation of the main institutional features of the
EMU.
On the monetary side, the independence of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (ESCB) can hardly be blamed as it is clearly a way to reinforce the
position of the monetary authority with regard to national political actors
and in particular governments. Similarly the no-bail-out provision is clearly
the simplest way to forbid the development of seignorage games within the
Union which would dramatically impair the capacity of the EMU as a whole
to conceive non-in°ationary successful stabilization policies. But on the other
hand, it also impairs the capacity of the ECB to adopt active measures by
means of unequal transfers to speci¯c countries, which can be useful as we
have seen. In the whole, even though the commitment power of the ESCB
is undoubtedly increased by this provision, it still may not be optimal.
29For the case of Argentina, the ¯scal de¯cits of the individual provinces are actually
¯nanced jointly through national taxation and the printing of money.
30See, for example, the discussion in V. Koen and M. Marrese [1995] and T. J. Balinos,
D. Hoelscher and J. Horder [1997].
33On the ¯scal side, the discussion turns on the so-called "stability and
growth pact", which severely limits the ability of national governments to
freely use their ¯scal tools and in particular the budget de¯cit. Again, from
our point of view, this provision should be viewed as a mixed blessing, in
particular because of the large independence of European monetary policy.
We have seen that a successful design allows both a commitment power to
the monetary authority and a large set of policy instruments used by the
various policymakers. By and large, it can be said that the commitment po-
sition of the ESCB is well established. It is then very important that enough
instruments are available to accomodate shocks. The no-bail out clause lim-
its the ability of the ECB to accommodate idiosyncratic shocks; the ¯scal
authorities should then have enough room to respond to these shocks. But
clearly the pact limits their ability to use their own instruments. This may
therefore well be a too stringent measure, detrimental to the capacity of the
EMU as a whole to adequately answer to shocks.
In terms of further analysis, three important extensions come to mind.
First, our analysis of stabilization policy looks exclusively at supply shocks.
This is relevant since these shocks produce price movements which tend to
stabilize nominal incomes. As noted earlier, this feature of markets created
an element of stability even with a non-interventionist monetary authority.
Clearly, extending the analysis to a setting with demand side shocks and thus
no countervailing price movements is of interest.
Second, the issue of stabilization policy in a monetary union could be pur-
sued by analyzing the consequences of ¯scal federalism. Such an institutional
arrangement adds new ¯scal instruments by facilitating interregional trans-
fers. However, the case of strong monetary union in which the central bank
has the ability to make state contingent transfers that di®er across coun-
tries nests any ¯scal federalism scheme. Hence, the study of ¯scal federalism
requires additional restrictions on the conduct of monetary policy.
Third, there is another monetary arrangement that is closely related to
monetary union: the adoption of the currency of another country.31 We term
this regime "dollarization" in recognition of the use of the U.S. dollar in a
number of Latin America countries, such as Panama and Argentina. This
structure is similar to monetary union except that the choice of stabilization
through monetary policy remains with one of the countries. Of interest is
31See, for example, the recent analysis of Bencivenga et al. [1999] on dollarization in a
setting where capital market integration is central.
34understanding how this relationship compares to the environment of multiple
currencies and to monetary union.
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Denoting ¸ and ¸
¤ the multipliers associated with the two constraints,









































Using the resource constraint to solve for ¸ and ¸

























as in the proposition.
38B Proof of Proposition 2
A. The maximization problem of an employed agent







































The ¯rst-order conditions lead to two equalities:
g
0 (nt) =



















We can rewrite this as:
ntg
0 (nt) =








which, given the individual budget constraint, can be expressed as:
ntg
0 (nt) =













qtMt (1 ¡ ¿t) ¡ mEh
t









Mt (1 ¡ ¿t)
and assuming that Á
E
t = Á






39which implies that nt is constant over time and denoted by n.
Remark then that:
pt (1 ¡ ¿t)nt =
1
qt






























which implies that µ = Á
E and ng0 (n) = 1: It is then easy to obtain the levels
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B. The maximization problem of an unemployed agent























































t and assuming that Á
U
t = Á
U; it follows from the








which implies that Á
U = µ = Á
E:





























Using a similar reasoning for the Foreign economy, we get from the clear-

























Given that the equality between money supply and the aggregate nominal









We then easily get the levels of consumption given in the proposition.
C Proof of Proposition 3































Denoting »t ´ (1¡¿F
t )
(1+¾F
t ) and given the expressions for the various levels of
consumption, this problem can rewritten as:
max
»t






The ¯rst-order condition generates the following equality:
»t = qt:
D Proof of Proposition 4
Any government takes the transfer received by his unemployed agent from
the central monetary authority, ¢S
t ; as given. The ¯rst order conditions
for the agents' programs and the resulting consumption levels and supply

















































The ¯rst-order condition for the home government implies IE
t = IU
t : Using
this condition, the home tax rate is given by:
¿
S


















fore the foreign government.
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t = 0 is a solution and show it is consistent with the
¯rst-order conditions. If ¢S
t = ¢¤S
t = 0, we verify from the ¯rst order
conditions of the individual governments that incomes are equal irrespective
of employment status. This equality of incomes requires
¿
S
t = (1 ¡ qt);¿
¤S
t = (1 ¡ q
¤
t): (32)
Second-order conditions ensure that it is the only solution. The consumption
and employment allocations for home agents are then obtained by evaluating
(12)-(13) given these policy choices. Similar expressions hold for foreign
agents.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. This expression for ¤SF comes directly from the di®erence between
(11) and (16). As in Cooper-Kempf [1998], taking the second-order Taylor
approximation of this expression, this gain associated to strong monetary











¤SF > 0 if var(µ) > 0 as µ²(0;1):
F Proof of Proposition 6
We let C, as a superscript or a subscript, denote variables for the constrained
monetary union case. The maximization problem of the monetary authority
is similar to the problem explored in the proof of Proposition 4, with the






























(i) Suppose that the monetary transfers ensure perfect income equaliza-
tion within the monetary union, given the ¯xed tax rate. Given the de¯ni-






















hence: pt = p¤
t: Using the market clearing equalities, the equalization of prices
is equivalent to qt = q¤
t , or corr(q;q¤) = 1: Hence this is a solution to the
governments problem i® corr(q;q¤) = 1: As we obtain the same allocation
as under a strong monetary union, we get that VS = VC i® corr(q;q¤) = 1:
(ii) Suppose that corr(q;q¤) is near 1 and the variance of taste shocks
is positive. From Proposition 5, VS > VF when var(µ) > 0: Since VS = VC
when corr(q;q¤) = 1 by continuity, VC > VF when corr(q;q¤) is near 1.
(iii) Suppose that var(µ) = 0: This implies that VS = VF (from Propo-
sition 5). Yet, when corr(q;q¤) 6= 1;VS > VC: Hence when taste shocks are
not too volatile and corr(q;q¤) 6= 1; VF > VC:
G Proof of Proposition 7
Given the expressions for consumption levels and using the fact that nt = n,








t + (1 ¡ qt)lnI
U



























45where ¸ is the multiplier associated with ¿t ¸ 0. In this optimization problem
the home government recognizes the e®ect of its policies on the equilibrium
























t) is pt+1qt+1n (p¤
t+1q¤
t+1n), It = qtIE




t + (1 ¡ qt)I¤U
t : Using these market clearing conditions, the derivatives




































The e®ects of tax rates on prices is zero since spending is independent of the
distribution of income within a country.































A = 0 (34b)
With µ = 1=2;(33a) and (33b) imply that Dt = D¤
t for all t. Further,
these conditions imply that
Dt + D
¤
t = It + I
¤
t (35)







2 + (1¡ µ)2 < 1: Hence, for (35) to hold,
46I
E





This implies that the employed in each country have lower nominal income
than the unemployed. Thus in order for (34a) to hold, as well as the analogous
condition for the foreign country, ¸ > 0 and ¸
¤ > 0: So, tax rates must be
zero in both countries.
As ¿t and ¿¤
t are equal to 0, given the de¯nitions of the monetary transfers,
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This completes the proof as 2Dt¡1 = Mt.
H Proof of Proposition 8
Note that under both designs, the employment and thus output levels are the
same. Then, given the welfare function for the representative agent and the
strict concavity of the utility function; an allocation of this ouput generating
perfect risk sharing dominates an allocation which does not guarantee perfect
risk sharing.
I Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Here we denote the welfare under the weak central bank allocation
as VW. If var(µ) = 0;VF = VS > VW; where the second inequality follows
from Proposition 8 as long as ¹ q and ¹ q¤ are below 1 so that there are some
states with unemployment in one of the two countries. If the countries never
experience unemployment so that qt = q¤
t = 1 with probability one, then
from Proposition 7, there is no in°ation. In this case, VW = VS > VF as long
as taste shocks are present. Hence by continuity, if qt and q¤
t near one on
average and not too volatile, then by continuity VW > VF:
48